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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this case as this appeal pertains to an appeal
of a final order of a criminal case, held in district court, a court of record, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO DISMISS BASED ON THE
STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE EXCUPLATORY EVIDENCE IN THE
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FORM OF A TEXT MESSAGE REVEALING THE INTENT OF THE VICTIM
TO HARM THE DEFENDANT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF A THIRD
PARTY, OR PROVIDE SUCH EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENDANT.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law,' [which the court] reviews for correctness." State v.
Cox, 2007 UT App 317, f 10, 169 P.3d 806 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f
6, 89 P.3d 162). To support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must demonstrate, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient" and, second,
"that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial." State v. Litherland, 2000
UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In evaluating counsel's performance, " an
ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions," State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,
468 (Utah Ct.App.1993), and "[w]here the record appears inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively," Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f
17, 12 P.3d 92. To show prejudice, a defendant must establish that "there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
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outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Further this failure applies to Trial Counsel's failure to apply due process
standards, the review of which would also be done for correctness. Failure to
supply defense counsel with exculpatory evidence is a violation of due process.
See Maryland v. Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (n[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . . " ) ; see also
United States v. Agurs, All U.S. 97, 107 (explaining that suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused, even without a request, violates due process). The review
of a failure of due process is a legal issue, for which the review is for correctness.
Id. Defendant additionally claims that the trial counsel erred in failing to make a
motion to dismiss based on the State's destruction of evidence. "Whether the State's
destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question
of law that we review for correctness.' However, because this question requires
application of facts in the record to the due process standard, we incorporate a
clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations.m
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, f 12, 162 P.3d 1106 (citation omitted), quoted by
State v. Jackson, 2010 Ut App. 136.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides the right of the
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accused to have the assistance of Counsel, which by its guarantee implies that the
assistance would be effective.

Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

Another provision is the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and its guarantee
to be secure in one's house. Additionally counsel relies on Articles 5 and 6 of the
U.S. Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Spencer Russell Strode was convicted of Attempted Murder in violation of
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-203 and Utah Code Annotated §76-4-102 in a jury
trial held from August 26, 2009 to August 28, 2009. During this trial, Mr. Strode
was represented by counsel, a Mr. Michael Humiston. Mr. Strode was sentenced
in the case on November 10, 2010. In a timely manner following his conviction
and sentencing, the Defendant, Mr. Strode, submitted his notice of appeal, through
counsel, to the state requesting review of these facts and this court accepted the
case. Defendant/Appellant through counsel now presents this argument for appeal
requesting that this court either overturn his conviction or remand the charges for a
new trial on the merits of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On October 8, 2008, Spencer Strode shot Spencer Rich.

2.

During the investigation, Lt. Manuel Escoto, a Naples City Police Officer,

came across a text, allegedly sent from the alleged victim, Spencer Rich to
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Anthony Mitchell.
3.

Lt. Escoto made a sworn statement about that statement in his "Affidavit and

Order for Search Warrant."
3.

Anthony Mitchell was an eye witness to the case, who was not present

during the trial.
4.

The nature of the text message was that Spencer Rich wanted assistance

"beating [Spencer Strode] up".
5.

The details about the text message were never provided to trial counsel.

There is no indication that trial counsel specifically requested them, nor that any
motion was made to dismiss the charges based on the missing evidence.
6.

Defendant was found guilty at a jury trial without being able to use to full

information regarding that text message to discredit/impeach the alleged victim in
this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL WHEN FAILING TO MAKE A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED
ON

THE

STATE'S

FAILURE

TO

PRESERVE

EXCPULATORY

EVIDENCE CRITICAL TO THE DEFENSE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE,
An attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) trial
counsel's performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of
State v. Strode, Appellant's Opening brief 7 of 15

reasonableness, and (2) trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced [the
defendant by depriving him of a fair trial." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, %
17, 153 P.3d 804 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

The right to effective counsel is a

guarantee provided in both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 12 and U.S. Constitution 4th Amendment. The right to counsel
implies that the counsel will not only be licensed, but that they will be competent
and diligent in working to assist their client through the often precarious legal
world. In this case, the failure of counsel was a failure to secure the defendant
access to exculpatory evidence that was crucial to the Defendant's claim of selfdefense.
The evidence in question was referenced in Lt. Manuel (Manny) Escoto's
"Affidavit and Order for Search Warrant." It referenced a text message sent from
the alleged victim in this case to a third party, Anthony Mitchell. See attached
Addendum.

The tone of the unrecorded and uncollected text message was a

request for the third party, Anthony Mitchell, to come to the parking lot of the
Shivers and Jitters (the location of the shooting), so that the third party could
"assist [Spencer Rich] in beating Spencer Strode up." This message was recorded
as fact by Lt. Escoto, and yet there is no indication that any effort was made to
secure the contents of the message, the number this came from, nor the number to
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which it was sent. The information supplied as almost an afterthought in the
Affidavidit provides insufficient evidence for Defense counsel to impeach the
alleged victim on his true "victim status" in this case.
The case law supporting the dismissal of this case is found under Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 4 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
In those provisions, it becomes clear that Defendant's due process rights were
violated when the state failed to secure exculpatory evidence that was within their
possession.

State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2007).

In State v.

Tiedemann, the court did not address the federal Constitutional, but instead relied
upon the provisions of the Utah Constitution, finding that the terms of the Due
Process clause in the Utah Constitution protected a defendant from the state's
destruction of evidence. Therefore, while this brief challenges the practice in both
federal and state Constitution, the major focus in this section will be related to the
decisions in state law.

In Tiedemann, a state evidence custodian destroyed

evidence pertaining to a murder trial after giving the officer in charge 30 days
notice of his intent to destroy the evidence. Tiedemann, at 1108.
The court in Tiedemann quoted Justice Stevens of the United States
Supreme Court in his opinion in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988),
where he stated that "there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to
prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of
State v. Strode, Appellant's Opening brief 9 of 15

evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair." Youngblood, at 61. The court in Tiedemann then reasoned
that the stance taken in Youngblood was too broad and too narrow. Tiedemann, at
1116. The overly broad provision was in allowing a case to be dismissed without
the showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id. The holding was too narrow in that
it required police wrongdoing. Id. Therefore, it appears that the true determination
on whether a case should be dismissed when evidence has been destroyed is when
the loss of that evidence prejudices the ability of the defendant to obtain a fair trial
and would meet both the federal and the state standard.
In State v. Jackson, 2010 Ut. App. 136, the court applied the Tiedemann
standard to determine that there was no reason to dismiss the case as a result of
police officers not collecting evidence. That case, however, can be distinguished
from the present case in that in Jackson the officers searching the vehicle, found
evidence of blood in the backseat of another's vehicle. The blood could have come
from many legitimate sources - or even as the result of the crime the defendant
was charged with, stabbing a dog. The officers, therefore, were freed from the
obligation of collecting that evidence as there was a non-exculpatory explanation
for the evidence in that case. In this case, however, there is no such innocent
explanation. That the alleged victim was requesting help to physically assault the
defendant gives credibility to defendant's claim that he was in danger and there is
State v. Strode, Appellant's Opening brief 10 of 15

no reason an officer should have interpreted it differently. Therefore, Jackson is
not applicable to the present case.
Now understandably, the evidence mentioned in this case was not destroyed
by the police. In fact, there is no evidence that the police took the effort to do
anything more than read a text message allegedly sent from the alleged victim to a
third party and record the gist of the message in a request for a warrant - no other
record of the text message was provided to the defense.

Further missing

information, includes the number the message was sent to, the number the message
was sent from, the exact language of the message, the timing of the message, etc.
Still, the fact is that the text message was within the knowledge of the police, and
could have been obtained had the officer exerted even a modicum of effort. Given
that factual scenario, allowing the text message to leave their possession without
collecting the evidence was negligent police work. The action allowed evidence to
be removed from any location wherein Defense Counsel could use the evidence to
defend his client. While this is not destruction, per se, the impact is the same. The
state was able to discover evidence, and then through their negligence, failed to
preserve said evidence, in spite of its clearly exculpatory impact.
The evidence showed that Spencer Strode and Spencer Rich were speaking
within a truck and that at some point Spencer Strode obtained a gun and shot
Spencer Rich four (4) times. This has never been disputed either by defense
State v. Strode, Appellant's Opening brief 11 of 15

counsel, the defendant, or the police. What has been the issue of debate is the
reason behind the shooting.

The police had in their possession a copy of a

statement made by Anthony Mitchell, who they treated as an eye-witness because
he was present at the time of the shooting. Had the text message from the alleged
victim to the alleged "eye-witness" requesting help "beating up" the defendant, the
presence of two threatening individuals, and a perceived intent from the victim of
causing physical harm to the defendant, Defense Counsel would have been armed
with potent evidence of Self-Defense as a defense to attempted murder.
Defense Counsel was unable to locate the witness in this case and was
unable to provide adequate information as to what happened in the parking lot
aside from what was agreed upon.
The failure of police to preserve this evidence at the time it became available
to them, and the inability of counsel to provide the appropriate witness to the trial
establish serious doubts as to the level of due process received by Mr. Strode in his
defense.
CONCLUSION
The case should be dismissed, because of the failure of the police to preserve
and protect a critical piece of exculpatory evidence. However, this argument was
not made prior to this appeal. Defense Counsel's failure to move for a dismissal
for a failure to preserve evidence was ineffective assistance of counsel, which
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hampered the ability of the defendant to obtain a fair trial. The case against the
defendant should be dismissed under the doctrine established by Tiedemann. In
the alternative, this case should be remanded for a hearing to determine whether
the case should be dismissed as a result of the state's negligence in failing to retain
material exculpatory evidence.
Dated this 15th day of January, 2010.
BRETT M. KRAUS

Attorney for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Corrected Opening
Brief was mailed to the following this 15th day of January, 2010:
Marian Decker
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Brett M. Kraus
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ADDENDUM
Attached are the following documents necessary for this appeal as an
addendum as required.
1.

Lt. Escoto's "Affidavit and Order for Search Warrant."

2.

Jury Instructions.

3.

Order and Judgment

All copies are of the certified and final orders submitted at trial.
Dated this 15th day of January, 2010.
BRETT M. KRAUS

Attorney for the Appellant
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT,

°0/»

COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

}
}

PLAINTIFF,

}

AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER FOR

}

SEARCH WARRANT

}
vs.

}
}

Spencer R Strode

}

D.O.B

}

11-20-1985

CASE NO. V08-0450

}
DEFENDANT(S)

>
}
}
}

STATE OF UTAH

}
} SS

COUNTY OF UINTAH

}

The affiant undersigned, being duly sworn, states under oath:

1.

I am a peace officer in the State of Utah and have been so employed for over ten years with
experience on patrol and investigations. I am currently employed as Lieutenant by the
Naples Police Department. My duties have included the investigation of violent crimes
including crimes involving weapons.
During my career I have been trained and involved in the investigations and arrest of people
involved in violent crimes. I attended the Utah Police Academy and I am currently a
certified police officer in the State of Utah.

The property for which a search warrant is sought is described as follows:
The search of a white 2006 Dodge Ram 1500 Mega Cab Utah listing A283PK. The
property and its contents including the camper shell area for evidence of illegal conduct.
We also request the search warrant for two cell phones, one belonging to the suspect,
(Spencer Strode) and one belonging to the victim, (Spencer Rich). All the property is
located in the Naples City shops which are located at 1300 S. 1200 E. Naples Ut.
previously seized with a warrant early today by UCSO Sgt Bevan Watkins except the cell $ 4
phones.
*
*

3
The grounds for which the search warrant as provided by Utah Rules of Criminal
A ^ ^4 ^
Procedure, Rule 40(b)(2)&(3) are as follows: The property has been used in the commission of a ^ t c\
^
crime and/or is evidence of illegal conduct.
4
The facts to establish the grounds for the insurance of a search warrant are:
October 12, 2008, Vernal Dispatch received a report of a male subject in Naples across
from the 7-11, (2500 S 1500 E.) had been shot numerous times and the suspect left in a
white Dodge Mega Cab.
5
A subject later identified as Anthony Mitchell, told Chief Mark Watkins that he had
witnessed this shooting take place. Later I conducted an interview of Anthony Mitchell. This
witness told me that the white Dodge Mega Cab leaving the crime scene belonged to Spencer
Strode. Anthony told me he was in front of the vehicle when the shots were fired. Anthony also
told me that prior to the shots being fired, he received a text message on his cell phone from ? H * *
Spencer Rich (the victim). The context of the text was something to the effect that Mr. Rich was *» j[*
requesting that Anthony Mitchell assist him in beating Spencer Strode upi
6
Based on my training and experience, text messages are automatically saved on the phone
sending the message and the phone or phones receiving the message. Further, cell phone
companies do not keep or store any text messages. The only source would be the phones
themselves.
7
During the investigation at the scene of the shooting, Sgt Bevan Watkins was assigned to
make contact with anyone coming to the scene or leaving the scene. His specific duty was to
inquire if anyone he talked to had any information about the shooting. While doing this, Sgt
j
Watkins observed a vehicle coming toward the crime scene. Sgt Watkins approaches the vehicle in^Js^ *
the 7-11 parking lot, directly across from the road from the crime scene. He makes contact with \ / ] t \
Rebecca Freeman who told Sgt Watkins that Spencer Strode had contacted her and wanted her to^ Krespond to the area of 4000 S. Vernal Ave and pick him up. She further told Sgt Watkins that
^4. ^ ^
Spencer wanted picked up because he was involved in a shooting. Rebecca was not sure if StrodefV 5 ^
had been shot or if he shot someone.
r.
8

Rebecca drove with your affiant in my patrol car to 3975 South Vernal Ave. where the

ft
a
£
f
?
^

Dodge Mega Cab was observed behind the residence. Looking into the vehiclefromthe
outside, I could observe twofirearms.Also I saw what appeared to be blood spatter and
bullet holes on the passenger side of the vehicle. The evidence observed in the vehicle is
consistent with the shooting incident we are investigating.
9

Officers from agencies assisting in the investigation located and placed Spencer Strode
under arrest.

10

After I made the initial observations of the Dodge Mega Cab, I then made contact with
Spencer for the purpose of conducting an interview. I explained to Spencer Strode his
rights according to "Miranda" and he waived his rights. He then told me about shooting
the victim. Strode admitted the altercation took place inside the white Dodge Mega Cab.
Strode told me the altercation was because he owed the victim $250.00 and was not able to
pay him. Strode told me he shot the victim numerous times and he said the weapon he used
to shoot the victim was on the floor board inside the vehicle. Strode told me that the
weapon he used was a black and silver pistol. I recalled seeing a black and silver pistol on
thefloorboardinside the Dodge Mega Cab. Strode also told me that the victim left his
weapon on the passengetiront seat. I recall seeing "ffie^other weapon as wellT" " ~~ "

11

We are respectfully seeking this warrant to process this crime scene.

It is now > ' ** arofaiflon Hie 12th day of October, 2008.1 am signing the affidavit, under oath, on the
presence of Judge
£-fe,y^>

^

^

/

^

^

Affiant

Lieutenant Manny Escoto
It is ordered that a search warrant be issued to process the crime scene and collect
evidence from the 2006 Dodge truck, Utah listing A283PK and a cell phone belonging to
Spencer Strode and a cell phone belonging to Spencer Rich.

DATE SIGNED fa ~ II-*)?

TIME SIGNED

ST-l**

District {Justic$ Court Judge
6.

Your affiant is requesting to enter the premises during the daytime* with liotke

*

W~

Date signed

Time signed

/r ^

Lieutenant Manny Escoto
This affidavit was sworn to before me by the above affiant, on the above date and time

Dated

Ip " lh 0 K
District Court Judge

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

:

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
AFTER THE EVIDENCE

:

CASE NO. 081800507

:

JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

vs.
SPENCER RUSSELL STRODE,
Defendant.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
INSTRUCTION NUMBER

/*~

You now have all the evidence. Three things remain to be
done:
First, I will give you additional instructions that you
will follow in deciding this case.
Second,

the lawyers will give their closing arguments. The

prosecutor will go first, then the defense. Because the
prosecution has the burden of proof, the prosecutor may give a
rebuttal.
Finally, you will go to the jury room to discuss and decide
the case.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

A-

You have two main duties as jurors.
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts
are. Deciding what the facts are is your job, not mine.
The second duty is to take the law I give you in the
instructions, apply it to the facts, and decide if the
prosecution has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
You are bound by your oath to follow the instructions that
I give you, even if you personally disagree with them. This
includes the instructions I gave you before trial, any
instructions I may have given you during the trial, and these
instructions. All the instructions are important, and you should
consider them as a whole. The order in which the instructions
are given does not mean that some instructions are more
important than others. Whether any particular instruction
applies may depend upon what you decide are the true facts of
the case. If an instruction applies only to facts or
circumstances you find do not exist, you may disregard that
instruction.

Perform your duties fairly. Do not let any bias, sympathy
or prejudice that you may feel toward one side or the other
influence your decision in any way. You must also not let
yourselves be influenced by public opinion.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

J

When the lawyers give their closing arguments, keep in mind
that they are advocating their views of the case. What they say
during their closing arguments is not evidence. If the lawyers
say anything about the evidence that conflicts with what you
remember, you are to rely on your memory of the evidence. If
they say anything about the law that conflicts with these
instructions, you are to rely on these instructions.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

f

During the trial I have made certain rulings. I made those
rulings based on the law, and not because I favor one side or
the other.
However,
• if I sustained an objection,
• if I did not accept evidence offered by one side or the
other, or
• if I ordered that certain testimony be stricken,
then

you

verdict.

must

not

consider

those

things

in

reaching

your

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

3

As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything
that makes you think I favor one side or the other, that was not
my intention. Do not interpret anything I have done as
indicating that I have any particular view of the evidence or
the decision you should reach.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

^

You must base your decision only on the evidence that you
saw and heard here in court.
Evidence includes:
- what the witnesses said while they were testifying under
oath; and
- any exhibits admitted into evidence.
Nothing else is evidence. The lawyers statements and
arguments are not evidence. Their objections are not evidence.
My legal rulings and comments, if any, are not evidence.
In reaching a verdict, consider all the evidence as I have
defined it here, and nothing else. You may also draw all
reasonable inferences from that evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
The law does not treat one type of evidence as better than the
other.
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually
comes from a witness who perceived firsthand the fact in
question. For example, if a witness testified he looked outside
and saw it was raining, that would be direct evidence that it
had rained.
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence. It usually
comes from a witness who perceived a set of related events, but
not the fact in question. However, based on that testimony
someone could conclude that the fact in question had occurred.
For example, if a witness ^testified that she looked outside and
saw that the ground was wet and people were closing their
umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence that it had
rained.
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge,
there must be enough evidence—direct, circumstantial, or some of
both—to convince you of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide.

INSTRUCTION NO. U
In deciding this case you will need to decide how
believable each witness was. Use your judgment and common sense.
In considering the believability a witness you may consider:
- How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or
otherwise observe what the witness testified about?
- Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this
case?
- Does the witness have any connection to the people
involved in this case?
- Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the
testimony?
- Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not,
is there a good reason for the inconsistency? If the
witness was inconsistent, was it about something
important or unimportant?
- How believable was the witness's testimony in light of
other evidence presented at trial?
- How believable was the witness's testimony in light of
human experience?

Was there anything about the way the witness testified
that made the testimony more or less believable?
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may
also consider anything else you think is important.
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said.
You may believe part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand,
if you are convinced that a witness lied, you may disbelieve
anything the witness said. In other words, you may believe all,
part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe many
witnesses against one or one witness against many.
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember
that no one's memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest
mistake. Honest people may remember the same event differently.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

(

The defendant testified at trial. Another instruction
mentions some things for you to think about in weighing
testimony. Consider those same things in weighing the
defendant's testimony. Don't reject the defendant's testimony
merely because he or she is accused of a crime.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

/

Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with a
crime is not evidence of guilt. The law presumes that the
defendant is not guilty of the crime(s) charged. This
presumption persists unless the prosecution's evidence convinces
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

M

As I instructed you before, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's
guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not
require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If the
evidence leaves you firmly convinced that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant
"guilty." On the other hand, if there is a real possibility that
he is not guilty, you must give the defendant the benefit of the
doubt and return a verdict of unot guilty."

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

l\-

A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense
unless that person's conduct is prohibited by law, AND at the
time the conduct occurred, the defendant demonstrated a
particular mental state specified by law.
Conduct" can mean both an "act" OR the failure to act when
the law requires a person to act. An "act" is a voluntary
movement of the body and it can include speech.
As to the "mental state" requirement, the prosecution must
prove that at the time the defendant acted (or failed to act),
he did so with a particular mental state. For each offense, the
law defines what kind of mental state the defendant had to have,
if any. For some crimes the defendant must have acted
"intentionally" or "knowingly." For other crimes it is enough
that the defendant acted "recklessly," with "criminal
negligence," or with some other specified mental state.
Later I will instruct you on the specific conduct and
mental state that the prosecution must prove before the
defendant can be found guilty of the crime(s) charged.
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The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with a particular
mental state.
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state
can be proved directly, because no one can tell what another
person is thinking.
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from
the surrounding facts and circumstances. This includes things
like what the defendant said, what the defendant did, and any
other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's mind.
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A defendant's "mental state" is not the same as "motive."
Motive is why a person does something. Motive is not an element
of the crime(s) charged in this case. As a result, the
prosecutor does not have to prove why the defendant acted (or
failed to act).
However, a motive or lack of motive may help you determine
if the defendant did what he is charged with doing. It may also
help you determine what his mental state was at the time.
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Proof of the commission of the crime of Attempted Murder,
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the
following elements of that crime:
1. Spencer Strode;
2. On or about October 12, 2008;
3 - Did intentionally;
4. Attempt to;
5. Cause the death of another.
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A person engages in conduct:
1.

"Intentionally"

with

respect

to

the nature

of

his

conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire

to engage

in the conduct

or cause

the

result.
2.
he:

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if

engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward

commission of the crime; and
a) intends to commit the crime, or
b) when causing a particular result is an element of
the

crime, he

acts

with

an

awareness

reasonably certain to cause that result.

that

his

conduct

is
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1. A person is justified in threatening or using force
against another when and to the extent he reasonably believes
that force is necessary to defend himself against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified
in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself as
a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force.
2. In determining imminence or reasonableness under
paragraph 1, you may consider, but are not limited to, any of the
following factors:
- the nature of the danger;
- the immediacy of the danger;
- the probability that the unlawful force would result in
death or serious bodily injury;
- the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities,
and
- any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties'
relationship
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The defendant has introduced evidence of self-defense. The
defendant is not required to prove self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, unless you find that the State has,
beyond a reasonable doubt, overcome flp^ evidence of self-defense,
you must find the defendant not guilty.
In other words, if, after considering all the evidence, you
have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted
in self-defense, you must find him not guilty.
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In making your decision, do not consider what punishment
could result from a verdict of guilty, Your duty is to decide
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Punishment
not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty
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In the jury room, discuss the evidence and speak your minds
with each other. Open discussion should help you reach a
unanimous agreement on a verdict. Listen carefully and
respectfully to each other's views and keep an open mind about
what others have to say. I recommend that you not commit
yourselves to a particular verdict before discussing all the
evidence.
Try to reach unanimous agreement, but only if you can do so
honestly and in good conscience. If there is a difference of
opinion about the evidence or the verdict, do not hesitate to
change your mind if you become convinced that your position is
wrong. On the other hand, do not give up your honestly held
views about the evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give
in to pressure from other jurors, or just to get the case over
with. In the end, your vote must be your own.
Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must
agree with the verdict before the defendant can be found
"guilty" or "not guilty." In reaching your verdict you mpiy not
use methods of chance, such as drawing straws or flipping a
coin. Rather, the verdict must reflect your individual, careful,

and conscientious judgment as to whether the evidence presented
by the prosecutor proved each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Among the first things you should do when you go to the
jury room to deliberate is to appoint someone to serve as the
jury foreperson. The foreperson should not dominate the jury's
discussion, but rather should facilitate the discussion of the
evidence and make sure that all members of the jury get the
chance to speak. The foreperson's opinions should be given the
same weight as those of other members of the jury. Once the jury
has reached a verdict, the foreperson is responsible for filling
out and signing the verdict form(s) on behalf of the entire
j ury.
For each offense, the verdict form will have two blanks—one
for "guilty" and the other for "not guilty." The foreperson will
fill in the appropriate blank to reflect the jury's unanimous
decision. In filling out the form, the foreperson needs to make
sure that only one blank is marked for each charge.
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Deputy Uintah County Attorney
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BY.

IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
COMMITMENT

vs.
Case No. 081800507
SPENCER RUSSELL STRODE ,
DOB: 11/20/1985,

Judge A. Lynn Payne

Defendant.
OFFENSE(s):Count 1: ATTEMPTED MURDER, a second degree felony
This matter came on for sentencing on the 10th day of November, 2009, before the
Honorable A. Lynn Payne . The Plaintiff was represented by G. Mark Thomas, Deputy Uintah
County Attorney. Defendant was personally present and represented by Counsel, Michael
Humiston . The Court heard statements from counsel for the parties, and based upon these
statements and the record before the Court:
The Defendant, having been convicted of or having plead guilty to the crime(s) of
Count 1: ATTEMPTED MURDER, in violation of Section 76-5-203 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended

and the Court having inquired of Defendant as to whether he had any statement he desired to
make; and no legal reason having been shown why judgment and sentencing should not be
imposed;
IT IS ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant is guilty of the crime(s) of
Count 1: ATTEMPTED MURDER, a second degree felony
and Defendant is hereby sentenced to serve ONE to FITEEN YEARS in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the Uintah County Sheriff for
transportation to the Utah State Prison and execution of the sentence given herein.
DATED this sz!L day of

A )C\X

, 2009.

AkA

A.
LwffitA. JL^mrayng—z—

DistrSPfflSfiftffi^
Approved as to form

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a true copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to Michael Humiston, Attorney for
Defendant, 23 West Center Street, Heber City, UT 84032; Department of Corrections, 152 East
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal, Utah 84078; and Utah State Prison,
P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.

DATED this '_J_ day of

A ^

, 2009.
',
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